In the workhorse DSGE model, the optimal steady state in ‡ation rate is near to zero or slightly negative and in ‡ation is almost completely stabilized along the business cycle (SchmittGrohè and Uribe, 2011). We reconsider the issue, allowing for agent heterogeneity in the access to the market for interest bearing assets. We show that in ‡ation reduces inequality and that LAMP can justify relatively high optimal in ‡ation rates. When we calibrate the share of constrained agents to …t the wealth Gini index for the US, the optimal in ‡ation rate is well above 2%. The optimal response to shocks is also a¤ected. Rather than using public debt to smooth tax distortions, the Ramsey planner front loads tax rates and limits. public debt variations in order to limit the redistributive e¤ects of debt service payments.
Introduction
Over the last 30 years income and wealth inequality has been rising in developed economies (see, e.g., Atkinson et al, 2011) and concern has grown for the distributive e¤ects of monetary policies (Galbraith et al, 2007 , Coibion et al, 2012 . In fact, Central Banks policy decisions are increasingly challenged for their apparently adverse e¤ects on inequality and asked to evaluate the distributive e¤ects of their actions.
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A relatively large body of empirical research has pointed out that in ‡ation is particularly harmful for the poor (Easterly et al, 2001 ) and high in ‡ation and inequality are positively related (Albanesi, 2007) . A popular argument in favour of price stability is the asymmetric incidence of the in ‡ation tax when wealth is unevenly distributed and portfolio composition of poorer households is skewed towards a larger share of money holdings, so that the in ‡ation tax burden would disproportionately fall on the poor (Erosa and Ventura, 2002; Boel and Camera, 2009; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2011) . In fact, this is the key justi…cation for endorsing price stability as the primary ECB objective as a contribution to reducing inequality and poverty. 2 On the other hand, recent contributions (see, e.g., Ragot, 2014) show that the distribution of money holdings is similar to that of …nancial wealth and much more unequally distributed than that of consumption, suggesting a stronger impact of the in ‡ation tax on richer households.
In the paper we analyze Ramsey-optimal monetary and …scal policies when distributive e¤ects of policy actions are accounted for. The issue is important because the DSGE literature based on the representative agent assumption simply ignores distributive issues that can play a fundamental role in shaping social choices. In fact the workhorse DSGE model is completely silent about the redistributive e¤ects of in ‡ation. Its standard prescription is that the optimal steady state in ‡ation rate is near to zero or slightly negative and in ‡ation should be almost completely stabilized along the business cycle (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2011). The result follows from the interaction of monetary transaction costs, which call for a zero nominal interest rate and a negative growth rate of prices (the Friedman rule), and price adjustment costs, which push the optimal in ‡ation rate to zero. Phelps (1973) conjectured that monetary …nancing could be used to alleviate the burden of distortionary taxation, when an exogenous amount of public spending has to be …nanced and lump sum taxation is not available. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011), in their survey of the literature, argue that the optimality of price stability is robust to the Phelps'e¤ect as well as to other frictions such as downward wage rigidity, hedonic prices, incompleteness of the tax system and the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
We modify the standard DSGE model by introducing Limited Asset Market Participation (LAMP henceforth), in the form of a distinction between holders of interest bearing assets (unconstrained agents) and agents who only own money (constrained agents). 3 This approach allows to verify how inequality concerns (and the uneven e¤ect of the in ‡ation tax on the poorer part of 1 See, e.g., A.W., "A monetary policy for the 1%", The Economist, London, Jul 5th 2012, and Belotti and Farley, "Fed policies: Income inequality has been one of the results", San Josè Mercury News, April 4th 2014.
2 For instance, in a speech at the International Day for the Eradication of Poverty, Intergroup "Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Fourth World Committee" event, held on October, 17th 2012 at the European Parliament in Brussels Benoît Coeuré, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, stated that "...poorer households tend to hold a larger fraction of their …nancial wealth in cash, implying that both expected and unexpected increases in in ‡ation make them even poorer. In addition, monetary policy shocks and surprise in ‡ation can have an impact on inequality through other sources of income. Income from labour and the unemployment of less-skilled workers tend to be adversely a¤ ected to a disproportionate degree during recessions. All in all, recent studies suggest that a higher in ‡ation rate is accompanied by greater income inequality ".
3 An example of this approach is found in Coenen et al (2008) .
the population) a¤ect the optimal rate of in ‡ation in a straightforward and simple way. Heterogeneity in the access to the market for interest bearing assets is a salient feature of the data. While the majority of US households 4 (92.5%) own transaction accounts (which include checking, savings, money market deposit accounts and money market mutual funds), only a small minority hold other …nancial assets, such as stocks, bonds, investment funds and other managed assets (which are held by less than the 20% of households). The major long term saving vehicle for US households are retirement accounts, which are held only by the 50.4% of families. Excluding such important di¤erences in wealth holdings from macroeconomic models implies that the distributional e¤ects of policies and shocks are also ignored. Our model cannot replicate the observed distribution of individual wealth holdings, but even a simple distinction between holders of interest bearing assets and the rest of the population will be shown to bear important implications for policy design. Our analysis unfolds in 3 steps. The …rst one is the identi…cation of the policymaker's incentive to use in ‡ation as a redistributive tool, highlighting the e¢ ciency-equity trade o¤. To this end we focus on a very simple model where goods are produced by monopolistic …rms, individuals inelastically supply labor, public consumption is nil and the subjective discount factor is one, so that the Friedman rule should call for zero in ‡ation. In this model, income inequality is determined by pro…ts entirely earned by assets holders, and we allow the planner to print money to …nance lump-sum transfers to non-asset holders. We obtain analytical results showing that inequality in individual wealth holdings unambiguously induces the policymaker to raise in ‡ation, thus highlighting the importance of the redistribution motive in shaping optimal policies.
Percentage of Families
The second step in our analysis is to allow for an endogenous labor supply, and to assume that the planner can o¤set monopolistic distortions through in ‡ation-…nanced production subsidies. We …nd that it is indeed optimal to levy an in ‡ation tax which increases in the share of households whose wealth is entirely composed of money holdings. This latter result suggests that LAMP should induce the planner to shift the optimal …nancing mix towards in ‡ation in the more realistic framework where distortionary taxes are needed to …nance public expenditures and monopolistic distortions cannot be removed through production subsidies.
To verify this latter conjecture, in the third step of our analysis we compute the Ramsey solution for a fully ‡edged DSGE model, with capital accumulation and price and nominal wage stickiness.
This adds to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) because the identi…cation of the optimal …nancing mix (in ‡ation and income tax) for a given level of public consumption takes into account the planner's concern for redistribution as a determinant of in ‡ation. We …nd that LAMP induces the planner to choose a higher in ‡ation rate in order to bene…t constrained agents. In contrast with received wisdom, the fundamental reason underlying this result is that expected in ‡ation shifts the …scal burden towards asset holders. Our result is based on the fact that money holdings are larger for wealthier individuals. Thus shifting the …nancing mix towards higher in ‡ation and lower direct taxes will raise the overall supply of production factors and mainly bene…t non asset holders. A steady state public debt equal to 60% of GDP and a share of constrained agents that matches the wealth Gini index for the US imply an optimal steady state in ‡ation rate of 2.5% on a yearly basis.
Finally, we analyze the business cycle implications of LAMP and obtain the optimal response of policy to a government consumption shock and to a productivity shock. Under the representative agent assumption, Ramsey-optimal …scal and monetary policies unambiguously recommend very low and stable in ‡ation and minimal income tax volatility over the business cycle (Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe, 2006) . Permanent debt adjustment to shocks provides the bulk of macroeconomic stabilization, and is used to obtain tax (and consumption) smoothing. Under LAMP such use of debt is substantially limited by the need to avoid the redistributive e¤ects of permanent debt variations. For the planner it is therefore optimal to let tax rates adjust more strongly to shocks. We also …nd a modest increase in in ‡ation volatility, which is exploited to drive money holdings (and consumption) of constrained households.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the rational expectations equilibrium and de…nes the Ramsey optimal policy. In section 4 we obtain the steady state results. Section 5 describes the optimal Ramsey dynamics and section 6 concludes.
The model
We consider an in…nite-horizon production economy populated by a continuum of households i 2 [0; 1]. Monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities characterize product and labor markets.
A demand for money is motivated by assuming that money facilitates transactions. Consumption purchases are subject to transaction costs Mt;i ) are such that a satiation level of money balances (v > 0) exists where the transaction cost vanishes and, simultaneously, a …nite demand for money is associated to a zero nominal interest rate. Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) the transaction cost is parameterized as follows
The government …nances an exogenous stream of expenditures by levying distortionary income taxes and by printing money. Optimal policy is set according to a Ramsey plan.
5 See Sims (1994) , Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a), Guerron-Quintana (2009).
Households
Households are distributed over the unit interval. A mass 2 [0; 1] of agents (constrained agents) indexed by c, cannot participate in the market for interest bearing assets and does not own …rms, while a mass 1 of agents (uncontrained agents, henceforth), indexed by u behaves according to the standard model and can buy and sell bonds and own …rms. Constrained agents, on the other hand, do hold money balances in order to exploit the transaction technology. All households share the same KPR utility function
:where 2 (0; 1) is the intertemporal discount rate, l i t denotes a bundle of di¤erentiated labor types 6 and c i t is consumption. We assume u c i t ; l i t to be strictly increasing, concave ( c ; 0) in consumption and leisure and twice-continuously di¤erentiable. (3) collapses to the standard logutility separable framework for c = 1:
7 We are going to consider the latter case throughout the whole paper.
Unconstrained consumers
Unconstrained households maximize (3) subject to the ‡ow budget constraint
and under the constraints c
w t is the real wage index; t is the income tax rate; t t denotes real …scal transfers; t are …rms pro…ts; R t is the gross nominal interest rate, B u t is a nominally riskless bond that pays one unit of currency in period t + 1. M u t de…nes nominal money holdings. k u t denotes the capital stock held by the representative unconstrained household, r k t is the rental rate of capital and is the depreciation rate. We assume nominal wages are subject to a Rotemberg quadratic adjustment cost: w governs the degree of wage stickiness. Households stand ready to supply any labor e¤ort required by …rms at the wage rate set by unions. We assume that the government grants depreciation tax allowances.
Given the functional form of the utility function, the production function and the functional form of the transaction technology 8 , the non-negativity constraints on consumption, capital and money balances are always non-binding and we can ignore them. Finally, we impose on unconstrained . For = 1 preferences are logarithmic also in leisure. 8 The KPR utility function goes to 1 as consumption approaches zero. It is also easy to see that the limit of transaction costs for money balances that approach zero is in…nite. We consider a Cobb-Douglas production function which implies that zero capital entails zero output and zero consumption.
households the standard no-Ponzi game condition on the accumulation of bonds:
The …rst-order conditions of the unconstrained household's maximization problem are:
where
Pt . As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) condition (6) states that the transaction cost introduces a wedge between the marginal utility of consumption, u c (c (7) is a standard Euler condition where t+1 = P t+1 =P t denotes the gross in ‡ation rate, while equation (8) is a standard Euler condition for capital. The income tax distorts capital accumulation at the margin, while this is not the case for in ‡ation since the rental rate of capital is not set in advance. Equation (9) implicitly de…nes the money demand function. Taking into account (7), condition (9) takes the familiar form
Equation (12) de…nes the money demand on the part of constrained households. In particular, the consumption to money ratio of constrained households is a negative function of expected in ‡ation and a positive function of the expected increase in the marginal utility of wealth. Note that (12) and (??) are identical because both households types de…ne their current money-to-consumption ratio taking into account the discounted payo¤ from carrying money into the next period. However these money-to consumption ratios are identical only in steady state, when
Outside the steady state the money-to-consumption ratio of unconstrained households can always manage to equalize discounted returns on money and discounted returns on bonds, whereas this possibility is precluded to constrained households. As a result the policy maker may exploit the real interest rate and the level of in ‡ation to steer consumption decisions of the two households groups. 
Unions
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006), we assume that each household supplies all types of labor j 2 (0; 1) and delegates the choice of the wage rate and of labor e¤ort to unions. As a consequence each household works the same number of hours.
14 Each labor union is a monopolistic provider of one type of labor and maximises a weighted average of the lifetime utility of its members subject to their budget constraint (equations 4 and 10) and to a downward sloping labor demand function,
where w t (j) is the speci…c wage rate for labor type j, l d t is a measure of the aggregate labor demand and w is the inverse steady state wage mark-up. The standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator allows to consider a representative union. More in detail, the objective function of the representative union is
When computing its optimal plan, the union takes into account that for each household total worked hours are l t = R 1 0 l t (j) dj, total pre-tax labor income is w t l t = R 1 0 w t (j) l t (j) dj and total wage adjustment costs are
The optimality 1 3 This would not be possible in LAMP models where it is assumed that constrained households cannot use money to smooth consumption. 1 4 In a separate experiment we consider also a competitive labor market in which unconstrained households and constrained households work a di¤erent number of hours. We veri…ed that under a wide range of di¤erent calibrations, unconstrained households'worked hours are very small or even zero. Moreover, the di¤erence in worked hours between constrained households and unconstrained households is always large. This is at odds with the data showing that labor income is positively correlated with asset holdings (see Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997) ). Nevertheless we report results for the competitive labor market case in section (4.3).
condition is: (14) states that in the absence of nominal wage stickiness, the net of taxes real wage is a constant mark-up over the ratio between the average marginal disutility of labor and the average marginal utility of wealth. Under wage stickiness, the wage mark up depends on its past and future values, on present and future in ‡ation and on the expected growth of hours and average marginal utility of wealth.
Labor Packers
Labor packers buy the di¤erentiated labor types from unions and produce the aggregate labor bundle that they rent to …rms. They operate under perfect competition and solve the following problem:
The optimality conditions are equation (13) 
Intermediate Firms
The representative intermediate …rm produces a di¤erentiated good z 2 (0; 1) under a standard Cobb-Douglas technology
and faces a downward sloping demand function,
where a t is total factor productivity whose logarithm follows an i.i.d. normal stochastic process. We assume a sticky price speci…cation based on a Rotemberg (1982) quadratic cost of nominal price adjustment:
where p > 0 is a measure of price stickiness. In line with Ascari et al (2011) , we assume that the re-optimization cost is proportional to output.
In a symmetrical equilibrium the price adjustment rule satis…es:
where mc t are the real marginal costs. Cost minimization implies that the following two equations hold:
From (16) it would be straightforward to show that 1 = p de…nes the price markup that obtains under ‡exible prices. Firm pro…ts are
Final Good Firms
Final good …rms buy di¤erentiated goods from intermediate …rms and produce an aggregated good which can be used both for private and public consumption and for investment. They operate under perfect competition and solve the following problem:
The optimality conditions are equation (16) and the price index
Government budget
The government supplies an exogenous, stochastic 15 and unproductive amount of public good g t . Government …nancing is obtained through an income tax, money creation and issuance of oneperiod, nominally risk free bonds. The government ‡ow budget constraint is then given by
" g t is a normally distributed i.i.d. government interest rate spread shock which captures innovations in the perceived riskiness of government debt.
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The Ramsey plan will satisfy the no Ponzi game condition:
Aggregation
Equations 24-29 de…ne aggregate consumption, aggregate hours, aggregate real money balances, bonds, pro…ts, aggregate capital and total output: 
Ramsey Optimal Policy
De…nition 2 A Ramsey optimal policy is a rational expectations equilibrium that attains the maximum of the following additive social welfare function
The Ramsey program is non-stationary, in the sense that in the initial period the Ramsey planner has an incentive to generate surprise movements in in ‡ation or taxes. We neglect these non-stationary transitory components and concentrate on the time-invariant long run outcome, which we refer to as the Ramsey steady state. This procedure is common in the literature (see for instance Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004a). 
Ramsey Steady State
The …rst step in our analysis is the identi…cation of the planner's incentive to use in ‡ation as a redistributive tool, highlighting the e¢ ciency-equity trade o¤. To this end we greatly simplify the model by imposing several parameter restrictions. In Model A we initially assume that leisure is not valued ( = 0), prices and wages are ‡exible ( p = w = 0), the discount factor is 1, labor is the only factor of production ( = 1), public expenditure, public debt and the labor tax are nil. Moreover, we set the parameter A in the transaction technology equal to one. Finally, we consider a separable utility function in consumption and leisure, i.e. = 1 and = 1. The planner's policy instruments are in ‡ation and lump-sum transfers. This will allow to pinpoint the planner's incentive to exploit in ‡ation to …nance redistributive policies.
In the second step of our analysis, Model B, we endogeneize the labor supply, allowing for positive values of , and we assume that the planner can subsidize production by levying the in ‡ation tax. The model is already too complex to obtain analytical solutions, and we must rely on numerical methods. To facilitate comparison with model A, we keep the restrictions adopted for , p , and w and maintain that public expenditure, public debt and the labor tax are nil. All the remaining parameters are set as in the full model calibration (see Table 2 ). This second step will show that e¢ ciency-enhancing policies, such as o¤setting monopolisting distortions are implemented with more strength if they also allow to reduce inequality.
Finally we compute the Ramsey solution for the full model, where the planner's problem is the identi…cation of the optimal …nancing mix (in ‡ation and income tax) for a given level of public expenditures. This latter exercise adds to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) and to Di Bartolomeo et al (2015) because we focus on the planner's concern for redistribution as a determinant of in ‡ation, which remains valid even if redistributive public transfers are not available.
4.1 Model A: the planner' s incentive to use in ‡ation as a redistributive tool.
De…nition 3 The social planner allocation in model A is de…ned as the pair fc u ; c c g that maximises (1 ) ln c u + ln c c subject to the aggregate resource constraint (1 ) c u + c c = l = 1.
Proposition 1 For 0 < < 1 the optimal pair fc u ; c c g is de…ned by c u = c c = 1.
Proof. The …rst order conditions with respect to c u and c c are respectively
(1 ) = 0 and c c = c c = 0. Combining the two …rst order conditions, one obtains c u = c c . Given the aggregate resource constraint (1 ) c u + c c = l = 1, it is trivial to see that the solution is c c = c u = 1. The equalization of the two levels of consumption under the …rst best depends on our assumptions about the concavity of the utility function. Indeed it is easy to see that under a linear utility function only the sum of the two levels of consumption would be determined, while relative consumption would not be pinned down. On the contrary, under a concave utility function, the value of a small amount of additional consumption is higher at low levels of income than at high levels of income. The …rst best allocation cannot be reached until all agents consume at the same level.
Let us now turn to the solution of the Ramsey planner's problem.
suggested in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011). Dynamics of the Ramsey plan around the steady state are computed using Dynare.
Proposition 2 Under the parameter restrictions imposed on Model A, the Ramsey steady state converges to the Golden Rule allocation .
Proof. See Appendix A. Proposition (2) allows us to compute the Golden Rule of Model A instead of the Ramsey steady state directly. The Golden Rule is obtained by maximising the instantaneous social welfare function subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions after imposing the steady state on the latter. This greatly facilitates derivation of the optimal steady state. In Appendix A we substitute the constraints in the objective function and reduce the Golden Rule problem to a simple unconstrained optimization in one variable.
The problem of the planner is to choose to maximise
c u ( ) and c c ( ) are made explicit in Appendix A.
Proposition 3 For = 0 the optimal steady state in ‡ation rate is = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A. Proposition (3) is the standard Friedman rule result obtained under representative agent models when = 1. The absence of discounting makes sure that the planner adopts a policy in which no new money is printed and no transfer occurs. Monopolistic competition does not a¤ect the result because labor is supplied inelastically and hours are always equal to one. As a result, the only potential ine¢ ciency comes from the presence of monetary transaction costs. At zero in ‡ation they are nil.
Proposition 4 Consumption inequality is strictly decreasing in in ‡ation.
Proof. In Appendix A, we show that the di¤erence between unconstrained agents'consumption and constrained agents'consumption is c c is decreasing. A positive in ‡ation rate reduces inequality for two reasons. On the one hand it indirectly taxes consumption out of pro…ts. As a consequence, unconstrained agents, who own …rms, contribute more to tax revenues. On the other hand in ‡ation-…nanced transfers equally bene…t the two households groups.
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Proposition 5 When > 0 = 1 cannot be a solution to the Ramsey planner's problem.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since inequality is strictly decreasing in , the planner faces a trade o¤ between e¢ ciency, which would be delivered by eliminating transaction costs, and equity that requires the equalization of consumption of the two agents. Failure of the Friedman rule under agent heterogeneity depends on the fact that (31) is increasing in when = 1, i.e. the equity motive has a more powerful marginal e¤ect when in ‡ation is nil.
4.2 Model B: e¢ ciency and redistribution when the labor supply is endogenous.
We now endogeneize the labor supply, allowing for > 0. Under monopolistic competition this implies that the planner is confronted with an e¢ ciency problem. We therefore introduce the possibility of in ‡ation-…nanced production subsidies, and investigate how the optimum subsidy is a¤ected by agents heterogeneity.
Remark 1 For any value of , an endogenous labor supply raises the optimal in ‡ation rate. A higher in ‡ation rate reduces ceteris paribus consumption and leisure inequality.
In Appendix B, we show that the planner's problem can be reduced to a system of two endogenous variables, in ‡ation and the tax rate (which is negative if production is subsidized). Figure  1 provides a graphical exposition. The schedule MW and MW'identify combinations of in ‡ation and subsidy that maximise welfare when parameter takes values 0 and 0:8 19 respectively. Their slopes are positive because an increase in in ‡ation raises transaction costs and lowers the consumption value of labor e¤ort. As a result the planner's incentive to subsidize production (and labor e¤ort) falls. The schedule GG identi…es combinations of in ‡ation and production subsidy that are consistent with a balanced budget constraint. Its slope is obviously negative. Note that the Friedman rule fails even under the representative agent assumption, = 0. To attain the …rst best, the planner should set = w 1 w and subsidize labor supply to o¤set distortions arising from monopolistic competition in the goods and labor markets. But such a policy is costly to obtain as lump-sum taxes are not available. The only way to obtain them is through in ‡ation, which means that to reduce monopolistic distortions, one has to increase consumption transaction costs. The trade-o¤ is resolved at point A, where labor supply is subsidized and the in ‡ation rate is above the Friedman rule level.
Under agent heterogeneity, the trade-o¤ is resolved at higher levels of in ‡ation and of the labor subsidy. Indeed, the planner indi¤erence curve shifts to the left, while the government budget constraint is una¤ected. The latter result follows from the fact that, for any given combination of policy tools, does not a¤ect aggregate variables, i.e. total employment and consumption. The planner indi¤erence curve, instead, requires higher levels of in ‡ation, i.e. of redistribution, for any given subsidy, therefore the optimal combination of in ‡ation and subsidy shifts from point A to point B.
The intuition for the result is straightforward. The in ‡ation tax is levied on individual money holdings, so the contribution of unconstrained agents is unambiguously larger. As a matter of fact these agents su¤er from a reduction in the consumption value of …rms pro…ts. This is only partly compensated for by the increase in labor income, which also accrues to constrained households. As a result consumption inequality unambiguously falls in in ‡ation. 
The full model
We now consider the full model. The time unit is meant to be a year 21 and we set the subjective discount rate to 0:96 to be consistent with a steady-state real rate of return of 4 percent per year. As Erosa and Ventura, 2002 we set to 64% and to 8%. To check the e¤ect of capital accumulation on the optimal in ‡ation rate we also consider the case where labor is the only factor of production which is obtained when is equal to 1. We set and w such that in the goods and labor markets monopolistic competition implies a gross markup of 1:2, and the annualized Rotemberg price and wage adjustment cost is 4:375 (this implies that …rms and unions change their price or wage on average every 9 months, see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004a). Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a), the preference parameter is set so that under a zero in ‡ation steady state the average household would allocate 20 percent of the time to work.
22 Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a), transaction cost parameters A and B are set at 0:011 and 0:075 and public consumption at 19% of GDP. Following Cogan et al (2013) we set steady state public debt at 60% of GDP. To highlight the e¤ect of steady state public debt on the optimal rate of in ‡ation we also consider the case where the debt-to-GDP ratio is 80%. We also experiment with di¤erent calibrations of the share of constrained agents , but in the benchmark case we set it at 0:8 to match the wealth Gini index for the United States which is around 0.78 23 (see Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997) ). In Appendix C, we report the details of the computation of the model Gini index. Price and wage stickiness imply an e¢ ciency trade-o¤ between price and wage adjustment costs that disappear at zero in ‡ation, and monetary transaction costs that vanish at negative in ‡ation. In addition, the introduction of exogenous public consumption expenditures makes sure that the government has to raise some revenues using either distortionary taxation or the in ‡ation tax. Table 3 summarizes our results. Taking the labor only model as a benchmark, 24 the …rst column of Table 3 allows to identify the in ‡ationary e¤ects of capital accumulation and rising debt-to-GDP ratio under the representative agent hypothesis. In the model with capital accumulation we obtain an increase in the optimal in ‡ation. Note that in a similar model Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006) obtain that optimal in ‡ation is 0:5%, slightly below our result. There are some important di¤erences between their model and ours that explain this outcome. Their choice of including transfers in the public expenditure variable unambiguously raises the planner's incentive to in ‡ate, as shown in Di Bartolomeo et al (2015) , whereas the cash in advance constraint on …rms working capital and the (partial) taxation of pro…ts at the uniform income tax rate work in the opposite direction. Further, their assumption that public debt is only 44% reduces the optimal in ‡ation rate because debt service payments are equivalent to public transfers and the propensity to in ‡ate rises with the size of transfers. In fact we obtain that optimal in ‡ation is unambiguously higher when public debt is 80% of GDP.
Parameters Model
Limited asset market participation has a non monotonic e¤ect on the optimal in ‡ation rate, which falls for 0:3 and rises thereafter. 25 To understand this result we ran a separate experiment identifying the optimal in ‡ation rate when the Ramsey planner cares only about the welfare of unconstrained agents. A planner who cares only about unconstrained agents'welfare would always positive levels of public consumption and public debt.
2 4 This model is the same as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a). 2 5 In = 0:3 the optimal in ‡ation rate is around 0.43%.
set a smaller in ‡ation rate relative to the representative household case. To understand this result bear in mind that a high in ‡ation cum low taxation scenario raises transation costs (thus penalizing the richer households) and raises labor incomes, thus bene…tting the poorer households. Note that constrained households, who do not own pro…ts, are particularly penalized by the negative e¤ect of monopolistic competition on labor demand, whereas unconstrained households do not see bene…ts from increasing their labor e¤ort. Hence, under the Ramsey planner's preferences (30) the nonmonotonic relationship between in ‡ation and obtains because even if a higher in ‡ation rate always bene…ts constrained agents, at relatively low values such welfare gain is smaller than corresponding welfare loss su¤ered by unconstrained agents. By assuming a competitive labor market, we also introduced the possibility that individual labor supplies be di¤erent. Note that in this case the ‡exible nominal wage reduces in ‡ation costs, but the absence of monopolistic distortions also limits the incentive to use in ‡ation as a substitute for income taxes. Under the representative agent assumptions the net e¤ect on equilibrium in ‡ation is a reduction in the optimal in ‡ation rate by about half percentage point. Under LAMP, for any given in ‡ation and tax rate constrained households raise both worked hours and consumption, whereas unconstrained households do just the opposite. By contrast, in a unionized labor market the labor e¤ort is identical and therefore too large (small) for unconstrained (constrained) households. Hence, in a unionized labor market an in ‡ation-…nanced tax reduction forces unconstrained households to further increase a labor e¤ort which is already suboptimally high at the given wage rate. By contrast, in a competitive labor market each group can optimally adjust its labor supply to the new policy mix. As a result, even at low values of the optimal in ‡ation rate increases relatively to the representative household case. comp. labor market 0.33% 0.47% 0.73% 1.51% - 
Ramsey dynamics
In this section we compute the optimal dynamics for the full model, in the presence of i.i.d. government consumption and productivity shocks. We compare the LAMP model to the representative agent (RA) model. Under LAMP we set = 0:8. We consider the case with steady state public debt at 60% of GDP. Figures 2 and 3 report the impulse response functions of the main variables to a 1% shock.
Government consumption shock
The optimal response of variables to a government spending shock under the representative agent assumption is well known in the literature (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004a ) and the addition of capital accumulation does not seem to imply important di¤erences. The trade o¤ between stabilising in ‡ation to avoid price adjustment costs and keeping the nominal interest rate constant to avoid swings in transaction costs is resolved in favor of the former: the Ramsey planner almost completely stabilises in ‡ation. Public debt is used as a cushion to stabilise tax rates and is increased permanently. Output and worked hours increase. Under LAMP debt accumulation still exhibits a unit root, but its long-run adjustment in response to the shock is much smaller than under the Representative agent hypothesis. This happens because debt accumulation has powerful redistributive e¤ect in favor of unconstrained households. The planner therefore chooses to front load tax adjustment with such strength that consumption of unconstrained households falls even if their gross labor income increases. The di¤erent time pro…le of tax rates implies that output and worked hours are less sensitive to the shock. Finally, the in ‡ation path is not a¤ected by LAMP. 
Productivity shock
It is well known that under sticky prices productivity shocks cause a fall of worked hours and a negative output gap. Under the representative agent hypothesis we observe a reduction of the nominal interest rate and of the tax rate, which are meant to remove these e¤ects. In fact output, worked hours and consumption increase, and the surge in total incomes allows to reduce public debt. The lower debt allows to reduce future taxes and to smooth the consumption increase. Under LAMP the policy mix tilts towards higher taxes and initially lower interest rates. Worked hours and output are less sensitive to the shock, whereas the initial fall in in ‡ation is stronger. The pattern of debt accumulation is quite di¤erent. In fact debt levels remain very stable because the tax smoothing incentive is overwhelmed by the need to limit the redistributive e¤ects of debt service payments. 
Conclusions
The main focus of this paper is to study the e¤ect of LAMP on the optimal in ‡ation rate in an otherwise standard DSGE model akin to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a). We question the widely held belief that a higher in ‡ation rate would necessarily penalize poorer agents who hold a larger fraction of their wealth in the form of money holdings. Richer households consume more and hold more money, therefore they contribute more to revenues from the in ‡ation tax which can be used to reduce the burden of direct taxes. As a result worked hours and the relative consumption of constrained households increase. In our full model the optimal in ‡ation rate is 2:48% when the share of constrained households is calibrated to …t the wealth Gini index for the US and the steady state public-debt-to-GDP ratio is 60%. For a 80% debt ratio optimal in ‡ation is above 3%.
Finally we obtain the optimal response to government consumption and productivity and risk premium shocks. We …nd that agent heterogeneity renders optimal to front-load tax adjustment in order to limit the redistributive e¤ects of permanent public debt variations.
Lagrangean is: 
The Golden rule equilibrium is obtained by maximising the instantaneous social welfare function under the constraints given by the competitive equilibrium condition after imposing the steady state on the latter. In this case the Lagrangian is: 
We can now rewrite the Golden Rule problem as an unconstrained optimization in just one variable; i.e. in ‡ation. The problem is the following: max (1 ) log (c u ( )) + log (c c ( ))
where c c ( ), c u ( ) are de…ned by eq. (45) and (47) respectively. To prove proposition (3), we assume = 0. Then we compute the …rst order condition of problem (49) using symbolic Matlab routines and we obtain the following expression: 
It is easy to see that the solution of equation (50) 
Proof of Proposition 5
The …rst order condition of problem (49), for > 0, reads as follows:
To proof that zero in ‡ation cannot be a solution, it is enough to show that Using symbolic Matlab routines, we compute the …rst order conditions of problem (59). We de…ne the Lagrange multiplier on the government budget constraint and obtain:
BU DG ( ; ) = 0
Combining equations (61) and (62), we can write
that describes the planner's desiredmarginal rate of substitution between in ‡ation and the labor tax, which implies an increasing relationship between the two instruments. The intersection between it and equation (63) is the solution to the planner's problem.
Total private sector wealth is given by w = m + b + k + q. Constrained agents, who represent a share of the model population, hold a fraction The Gini index is given by 1-2B, where B is the area reported in Figure 3 . Area B can be easily computed, using the formulae for the areas of triangles and trapezoids, hence the Gini index is 
